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THE DOWNSIDE OF JUDICIAL 
RESTRAINT: THE (NON-)EFFECT OF  
JONES V. HARRIS 
JOHN C. COATES IV* 
In 1970, Congress added section 36(b) to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”).
1 Section 36(b) imposes a fiduciary 
duty on investment advisers of mutual funds “with respect to the 
receipt of compensation”
2 and creates a private right of action to 
enforce this duty. In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management,
3 
the Second Circuit outlined what would become the generally 
accepted test of whether the adviser fees were in an acceptable range. 
Gartenberg set out a number of non-exclusive factors to be 
considered: the nature and quality of the services provided; the 
profitability to the adviser of providing services to the fund; realized 
economies of scale; fee structures of comparable funds; the 
independence and conscientiousness of trustees; and fall-out benefits.
4 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit specifically disavowed Gartenberg in 
Jones v. Harris,
5 emphasizing the candor of the adviser to the board as 
the primary consideration in determining whether the adviser’s 
compensation was lawful under the ICA.
6 Based on its view that the 
mutual fund markets are sufficiently competitive, the Seventh Circuit 
held that absent extreme circumstances the only cause of action under 
section 36(b) is for a failure of the adviser to make full disclosure. The 
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Seventh 
Circuit decision and instead adopted the Gartenberg test with minor 
adjustments.
7 This short article will assess the likely impact of Jones 
 
  *  John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. 
  1.  15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b) (West 2009). 
  2. Id. 
  3.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
  4. Id. at 928. 
  5.  Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008). 
  6. Id. at 632. 
  7. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:05:17 PM 
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and evaluate the Supreme Court’s decision to exercise what would 
commonly be called “judicial restraint” in its analysis. 
Little has changed from the pre-Jones v. Harris
8 legal environment. 
True, section 36(b) cases will move through the courts a bit differently 
from now on. Lower courts will not be able to dismiss cases solely on 
the basis that a given fee is within industry norms and they will be 
required to consider evidence comparing a fee with fees charged by 
the same advisor to institutional funds or other institutional clients. 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to rule out any particular set of arguably 
relevant facts for purposes of section 36(b) analysis, or to establish 
any bright-line rules establishing how plaintiffs might conclusively 
demonstrate that a fee is excessive,
9 means that fewer cases are likely 
to be decided on a motion for summary judgment. 
Nevertheless, federal trial court judges had enormous discretion 
prior to Jones and continue to have enormous discretion to award 
damages, or not, under section 36(b). Since the Supreme Court chose 
to give little additional meaningful guidance to lower courts on what 
factors to use, beyond slight modifications to the Gartenberg factors,
10 
the probability of liability after trial will continue to depend on the 
judge to which each case is assigned. If future cases are based not on 
what the judge had for breakfast,
11 then they will certainly be based 
on the judge’s prior (and not necessarily known) beliefs about how 
strong competitive market forces are in restraining fees. Since judge 
assignments are not known prior to a case being filed, the outcome of 
cases will be unpredictable, as in the past. Relatively few cases will be 
brought, as in the past.
12 Both plaintiffs—effectively controlled by 
 
  8.  Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). 
  9. Id. at 1428. 
  10.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1982) (providing 
six factors to consider in weighing whether the mutual fund investment advisor breached a 
fiduciary duty through charging excessive fees: nature and quality of services provided; the 
profitability of the fund to the advisor; economies of scale operating as the fund grows larger; 
fee structures of comparable funds; the independence and conscientiousness of trustees; and 
fall-out benefits). 
  11. See  Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judges’ Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 235 n.16 (1990) (discussing Ronald Dworkin’s critique of legal realism, but 
noting that the closest published phrase used by a realist, or a contemporary interlocutor of a 
realist, was Roscoe Pound’s reference to “cadi” justice administered “at the city gate by the light 
of nature tempered by the state of his digestion.” See Roscoe Pound, The Decadency of Equity, 
5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 21 (1905)). 
  12.  With the assistance of lawyers and experts (both defense and plaintiff) involved in 
pending section 36(b) cases, to whom I extend thanks, I have been gathering data on section 
36(b) cases. So far, I have identified fewer than twenty discrete fund complexes that were DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:05:17 PM 
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plaintiff attorneys, who are averse to the risk of losing the time and 
effort they invest bringing a case—and defendants—effectively 
controlled by in-house attorneys and managers of fund advisory firms, 
who are averse to the risk of a losing a high-profile case with potential 
for both large money damages and reputational harm—will be likely 
to settle cases before a trial on the merits. 
I. THE IMMEDIATE BENEFICIARIES OF JONES 
Thus, the primary beneficiaries post-Jones are lawyers. Plaintiff 
attorneys will continue to bring fee cases and to extract fees from 
settlements in some cases. Defense attorneys will still have to be paid 
to defend all cases, good or bad, and fund and fund advisor corporate 
counsel will have to be paid to advise and manage a time-intensive fee 
review process in the shadow of potential fee litigation. Fund 
directors, who are not typically paid by the hour but receive fixed fees, 
will need to expend time and effort to go through a fee review and 
approval process, with lengthy documentation, and will face the risk 
of depositions, all without regard to whether the fees in question are 
clearly competitive or not. In the end, of course, shareholders—fund 
investors—have to pay for all of those attorney hours: plaintiffs’ 
attorney fees come out of settlements; defense litigator fees are paid 
by advisors in the first instance, but ultimately by fund investors in the 
form of higher fees; and defense corporate counsel are paid directly 
by funds and indirectly through fund advisor fees. 
II. WILL THE POST-JONES LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR  
SECTION 36(B) BENEFIT SHAREHOLDERS OF FUNDS? 
Shareholders will only benefit from all of this lawyer expense if 
cases are in fact brought against funds charging higher-than-
competitive fees and if the resulting settlements involve fee 
reductions. Evidence from an ongoing research project suggests that 
such cases will be rare. To date, litigants have sued, almost exclusively, 
advisors charging fees that are below the median for funds of a similar 
type, advising funds that are in the top quartile of assets under 
 
targets of “pure” 36(b) litigation in the past ten years. “Pure” 36(b) section cases are those in 
which 36(b) claims were based on excessive fees on their own, rather than piggy-backed on 
claims involving allegations of advisory complicity in late trading, market timing, or other 
practices not directly related to fees. I list the “pure” cases in Appendix A. (If readers are aware 
of any additional cases, please contact me with the citations.) By contrast, in 2007, there were 
over 600 advisory complexes. DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:05:17 PM 
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management.
13 In other words, plaintiff attorneys have been targeting 
advisors of relatively large funds charging relatively low fees. As 
depicted in Figure 1, of the relatively few pure section 36(b) cases
14 
brought since 2000 that I have been able to identify, all have primarily 
targeted advisors in quadrants (1, 4) and (2, 4), where the first number 
indicates the quartile for expenses (the x-axis on Figure 1), and the 
second number indicates the quartile for fund size—and not against 
funds being charged relatively high fees, which would be in quadrants 
(3, y) or (4, y). Based on my analysis, not a single case has been 
brought against an advisor to an equity fund ranked below the top 
quartile in size. 
 
Why would plaintiffs’ attorneys target those advisors, rather than 
advisors charging relatively high fees? The answer is simple: the 
highest fees tend to be charged to the smallest funds, and because the 
prospective relief under 36(b) is based on the absolute size of excess 
 
  13.  This is true of each of the cases listed in Appendix A, based on data on assets under 
management and total expense ratios for over 600 advisors for equity funds from Simfund for 
2007. Simfund is a database providing information on mutual funds, funds-of-funds, and ETFs. 
  14. See supra note 12 for a discussion of how I identify “pure” 36(b) cases. DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:05:17 PM 
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fees, rather than on their relative size.
15 Thus, prospective damages are 
greatest when the target is large. But wouldn’t a damage award be 
most likely when the fees are relatively high? Not necessarily. A 
damage award would be most likely if, but only if, courts consider 
comparable fees in reaching liability determinations, –something that 
Gartenberg
16 and Jones
17 permit, but a baseline on which both courts 
cast some doubt. 
Moreover, as noted above, the parties have powerful interests to 
settle, and the vast majority of 36(b) cases settle.
18 Even if settlements 
are correlated with expected liability, settlements are likely to be 
much more sensitive to differences in damage awards caused by 
differences in fund size, and not as sensitive to differences in the 
expected probability of liability caused by differences in relative fee 
levels. This is because expected damage awards rise very quickly as 
one moves from the smallest to the largest funds—indeed, the largest 
funds are now much larger than the smallest funds. The variation in 
expected return due to variation in fund size is not subject to 
significant judicial discretion: fees are a fixed percentage of fund 
assets, and legal fees are a relatively fixed fraction of fee overcharges. 
By contrast, trial courts have enormous discretion in deciding whether 
liability exists in 36(b) cases, and that discretion will be used 
differently by different judges (based, among other things, on their 
prior beliefs about how strong competition is as a restraining force on 
fund fees). Since both Gartenberg and Jones questioned the 
significance of fee comparisons—the expected liability for complaint 
attacking a relatively high fee will often be only slightly higher than 
the expected liability for attacking a relatively low fee. 
 
 
 
  15.  15 U.S.C.A. § 80(a)-35(b)(3) (West 2009). 
  16.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that 
the fee charged by advisors is a factor to be considered, but not the “principal” factor). 
  17.  Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010) (noting that the fees charged by 
other advisors should not be the principal consideration, but that this does not absolutely 
preclude their consideration). 
  18.  Of the cases listed in Appendix A, 80 percent of those that had been resolved as of this 
writing were settled. See also Mark S. Van Broek, The Demand Requirement In Investment 
Company Act Shareholder Actions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1500, 1528 n.158 (1983) (noting that, as 
of 1982, most section 36(b) cases have settled). DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:05:17 PM 
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III. THE DOWNSIDE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Judicial restraint has long been touted as a virtue by political 
conservatives
19 who viewed the expansion of civil rights and civil 
liberties under the Warren Court as turning courts into unelected 
legislators. Chief Justice John Roberts, before joining the Supreme 
Court, advocated judicial restraint, and was touted by conservatives as 
a “model of judicial restraint.”
20 More recently, political liberals have 
rediscovered the virtues of judicial restraint,
21 as the conservative 
majority on the Supreme Court has radically rewritten whole sections 
of Constitutional law in favor of political activists at the National 
Rifle Association,
22 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
23 companies 
engaged in price-fixing,
24 mass tortfeasors,
25 and employers charged 
with discrimination.
26 All of these decisions were written or joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts. Despite the evident activism of these decisions, 
however, the Roberts Court is capable of restraining itself—as in 
cases like Jones v. Harris—in technical cases that grab few headlines 
and offer no talking points for political fundraisers. 
 
  19. See  e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 69–100 (The Free Press 1990) (criticizing the Warren Court); ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
16–23 (1962) (same); see also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES  LECTURES 66–75 (Harvard University Press 1958) (criticizing judicial restraint 
broadly); MARK  TUSHNET,  THE  WARREN  COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 38–42 (University Press of Virginia 1993) (characterizing the Warren Court as 
political rather than legal). 
  20.  Edward Whelan, Op-Ed, A Model of Judicial Restraint, Not Activism, L.A.  TIMES  
(Sept. 6, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/06/opinion/oe-whelan6. 
  21. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 225 (2004) (maintaining that the Rehnquist Court “carried the theory 
of judicial power developed by its predecessors to its logical conclusion”). 
  22. See  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (striking down a 
handgun law on Second Amendment grounds); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 
3025 (2010) (same, and incorporating the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
  23.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (overturning 
several precedents and utilizing the First Amendment to strike down a 50-year old federal 
statute barring corporations and unions from making independent political expenditures in 
federal elections). 
  24. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) 
(overturning a ninety-seven-year-old precedent to hold that vertical price-fixing schemes are not 
per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
  25.  Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007) (deeming a jury award of 
damages designed to punish the defendant for harm to persons not before the court as a 
“taking” of property without due process). 
  26.  Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (interpreting Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act to bar claims based on decisions made more than 180 days prior), 
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:05:17 PM 
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Unfortunately, sometimes-judicial activism is precisely what a 
statute needs. Sometimes, judicial “activism” is simply another name 
for the conventional evolution of the law in a fashion familiar to all 
lawyers from first-year common law courses—a process the most 
legally conservative jurists (whether politically liberal or 
conservative) would embrace. In enacting section 36(b), Congress 
gave the federal courts an unappetizing job: to discern limits based on 
a vaguely stated standard on compensation in what is clearly both a 
conflicted but also competitive context. That job necessarily involves 
exercise of judicial discretion. For an appellate court to attempt to put 
some order on the chaos invited by the statutory standard is precisely 
what courts have long attempted to do. Courts create order in an 
iterative fashion by coupling decisions with written opinions, 
explaining their reasoning, which become precedent to be 
distinguished or followed based on further reasons, and so on. In 
Jones v. Harris, the Court squashed the nascent effort by the Seventh 
Circuit to begin this process—not by disagreeing with what the 
Seventh Circuit had decided and announcing its own interpretative 
reasoning, but by punting the entire shapeless mess of section 36(b) 
back to the federal district courts. An apparent adherence to the “rule 
of law”—rejecting a contestable interpretation of a statute—becomes 
instead its very opposite, rejecting by implication any effort by the 
federal circuit courts to organize or shape litigation under section 
36(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:05:17 PM 
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APPENDIX A  LIST OF “PURE” SECTION 36(B) CASES  
FILED SINCE JAN. 1, 2003 
 
Case, Court                                                                                                                                 Docket No. 
Hunt v. INVESCO Funds Group, Inc., S.D. Texas 
04-2555 
Baker v. Am. Century Inv. Mgmt., Inc., W.D. Missouri 
04-4039 
Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., D. Minnesota 
04-4498 
Reaves v. Federated Investors, Inc., W.D. Pennsylvania 
05-201 
Bennett v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., D. Massachusetts 
04-11651 
Strigliabotti v. Franklin Resources, Inc., N.D. California 
04-883 
Sins v. Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, D. Colorado 
04-1647 
Dumond v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., D. Massachusetts 
04-11458 
Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisers Inc., S.D. New York  
03-5896 
Krueger v. Neuberger Berman Mgmt., Inc., S.D. New York 
05-1316 
Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., N.D. Illinois 
04-8305 
Vaughn v. Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLC, D. Massachusetts 
04-10988 
Williams v. Waddell & Reed Inv. Mgmt. Co., D. Kansas 
04-2561 
 